

Message Text

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S E C R E T USNATO 747

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC
SUBJECT: NPG TECHNOLOGY STUDY - MEETING OF MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
TEAM

REF: USNATO 466

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A PAPER BY DR. SHAW OF MOD (UK), CHAIRMAN
OF THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS TEAM (MIT), OUTLINING POINTS FOR
DISCUSSION AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE MIT ON FEBRUARY 18-20 AT
NATO HEADQUARTERS.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. LISTED BELOW ARE SOME POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED AT OUR FIRST
MEETING. THERE ARE NO DOUBT OTHERS THAT TEAM MEMBERS WOULD
LIKE TO RAISE AT THE MEETING. COMMENTS ON THE POINTS LISTED,
WHERE GIVEN, ARE VERY MUCH FIRST THOUGHTS WRITTEN DOWN HERE
TO ENCOURAGE DISCUSSION BY THE TEAM. I AM SORRY THEY ARE SO
LATE BUT GIVEN THAT THEY ARE MEANT TO GET THE DISCUSSION
GOING, I HOPE THIS WON'T MATTER TOO MUCH.

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POINT 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL EFFECTS.

2. THIS QUESTION IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT WE HAVE TO
DEAL WITH, AND IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO GET SOME IDEAS HOW

NEW TECHNOLOGY INFLUENCES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL EFFECTS VERY EARLY IN OUR WORK.

3. A SIMPLE WAY OF DOING THIS MIGHT BE TO

- A. ASSUME A NUMBER OF TYPICAL TARGETS INCLUDING, SAY, HARD POINT TARGETS, BATTLEFIELD CONCENTRATIONS OF VARIOUS SIZES, AND AIRFIELDS;
- B. CALCULATE YIELDS REQUIRED FOR STRIKE WITH DELIVERY SYSTEMS WITH CURRENT ACCURACIES, AND DEDUCE, USING SOME AGREED CRITERIA, AREAS OF CIVILIAN DAMAGE AND AREAS OVER WHICH THERE WOULD BE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES;
- C. DO THE SAME CALCULATIONS WITH DELIVERY SYSTEMS WITH IMPROVED GUIDANCE, ASSUMING THAT SCALING OF WEAPON EFFECTS IS ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING LAWS;
- D. DO THE SAME CALCULATIONS ASSUMING PARTICULAR WEAPON EFFECTS ARE ENHANCED OR SUPPRESSED TO THE EXTENT WE ARE ADVISED IS NOW POSSIBLE.

4. CALCULATIONS OF THIS NATURE SHOULD GIVE US SOME BASIS FOR DISCUSSING WHETHER THE SORT OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL DAMAGE SHOWN IN VARIOUS PHASE I NPG STUDIES IS SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED AND, IF SO, IN WHAT WAY AND FOR WHAT TYPES OF TARGET.

5. WE HAVE DONE SOME PRELIMINARY WORK ALONG THESE LINES IN UK AND I CAN DESCRIBE, AT OUR MEETING, THE WAY WE WENT ABOUT THIS TO SEE IF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TEAM CONSIDER THAT SOMETHING SIMILAR WOULD BE USEFUL FOR OUR NATO STUDY. WE SHALL THEN HAVE TO DECIDE HOW THE AGREED WORK WILL BE DONE.

POINT 2 IN WHAT OTHER WAYS DOES NEW TECHNOLOGY AFFECT THE MILITARY USEFULNESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USED TACTICALLY.

6. WE WILL PROBABLY NEED TO AWAIT OUTPUT OF CALCULATIONS ON POINT 1 ABOVE BEFORE WE ARE ABLE TO TAKE THIS DISCUSSION VERY FAR. BUT I SHOULD WELCOME ANY FIRST THOUGHTS FROM TEAM MEMBERS.

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SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE ARE

- A. GREATER PRECISION IN GUIDANCE MAY MEAN FEWER CONSTRAINTS ON USE CLOSE TO OWN TROOPS; IS THIS LIKELY TO BE A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN GENERAL;
- B. IF GREATER PRECISION IS USED TO DELIVER SMALLER YIELDS AGAINST TARGET ELEMENTS, RATHER THAN LARGER YIELDS AGAINST A GROUP OF TARGET ELEMENTS, THIS PROBABLY MEANS MORE WEAPONS, MORE DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND FAR BETTER INFORMATION ABOUT THE FINE STRUCTURE OF THE TARGETS BEING STRUCK;
- C. ANY OTHER POINTS THAT MEMBERS CAN SUGGEST FOR DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT.

POINT 3. IF NEW TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS CAN SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE GENERAL PICTURE OF MILITARY USEFULNESS AS DEVELOPED IN PHASE

I STUDIES, ARE THERE ANY REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET IF THIS ADVANTAGE IS TO BE OBTAINED?

7. DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT DEPENDS ON POINT 1 AND POINT 2.
AT FIRST SIGHT, IT COULD BE SUGGESTED THAT NEW TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS MIGHT REQUIRE IMPROVEMENTS IN
A. SURVEILLANCE AND ACCURACY OF TARGET ACQUISITION;
B. RAPIDITY OF POLITICAL AUTHORISATION AND OF REACTION BY EXECUTING AUTHORITIES;
C. OTHER POINTS SUGGESTED BY MEMBERS.

POINT 4. WP REACTIONS TO NEW TECHNOLOGY

8. POINTS 1, 2, 3 ABOVE ARE DEVELOPED ONLY IN TERMS OF NATO USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS. WE NEED TO LOOK AT OTHER SIDE'S POSSIBLE REACTIONS.

MAIN QUESTIONS ARE PROBABLY

- A. HOW DOES BALANCE CHANGE WHEN
 - (I) NATO ALONE HAS NEW TECHNOLOGY;
 - (II) WP HAS IT ALSO, IF NECESSARY;
- B. CAN CHANGES IN WP TACTICS DECREASE OR ELIMINATE ANY ADVANTAGE FROM NATO POSSESSION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY.

POINT 5. CONVENTIONAL WEAPON ASPECTS OF NEW GUIDANCE TECHNOLOGY

9. I AM NOT AT ALL CLEAR HOW MUCH WE CAN EXPECT TO SAY ABOUT THIS SECRET

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POINT, AND WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME SUGGESTIONS. THERE ARE SOME FAIRLY OBVIOUS OBSERVATIONS SUCH AS

- A. BETTER FIRST SHOT KILL PROBABILITY SHOULD LEAD TO LOGISTIC ADVANTAGES;
- B. TO USE BETTER FIRST SHOT KILL PROBABILITY COULD WELL RAISE NEED FOR MATCHING ADVANCES IN SURVEILLANCE AND ACCURACY OF TARGET ACQUISITION;
- C. IF NATO ALONE HAS PGMS, THEN CASUALTY RATE TO WP FORCES SHOULD BE INCREASED - AN OBVIOUS ADVANTAGE TO NATO;
- D. IF BOTH NATO AND WP HAS PGMS, THE CASUALTY RATES TO BOTH SIDES ARE INCREASED; THIS IS NOT OBVIOUSLY TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE AND COULD, IN THE END, MERELY HAVE THE EFFECT OF SHORTENING THE CONVENTIONAL PHASE OF ANY OPERATIONS;
- E. ARE THERE LIKELY TO BE ANY ADVERSE EFFECTS - EG ON MORALE - OF VERY HIGH CASUALTY RATES;
- F. WHAT IS EFFECT ON THE 'NUCLEAR THRESHOLD'.

10. I DOUBT THAT WE SHALL HAVE TIME ENOUGH TO CARRY OUT QUANTITATIVE STUDIES ON THE EFFECTS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY ON THE CONVENTIONAL BATTLE, AND PERHAPS THE MOST WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DO IS TO SPEAK ONLY IN QUITE GENERAL AND QUALITATIVE TERMS.

POINTS 6 - ?

1. THERE ARE CERTAINLY NUMEROUS OTHER POINTS WE SHALL HAVE TO
CONSIDER. I'D BE GLAD TO DISCUSS ANY THAT TEAM MEMBERS MAY
WISH TO RAISE AT THE MEETING.

END TEXT

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